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THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SEC DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS: PREPONDERANCE AND BEYOND
INTRODUCTION

Disciplinary hearings conducted by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) are administrative proceedings through which the SEC
imposes sanctions on individuals who have violated the Securities
Acts.' These sanctions are imposed to protect the investing public,'

1. E.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979); Collins See.
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Blaise D'Antoni & Assocs. v. SEC,
289 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961). The SEC was created by
Congress to protect the investing public from fraudulent stock schemes through the
enforcement of the Securities Acts, which replaced the existing principle of caveat
emptor with a doctrine of full disclosure. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 181, 186 (1963); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 129-30 (2d ed. 1961).
The SEC enforces Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, originally enacted as 11 U.S.C.
§ 501-676 (current version at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (Supp. 1979)), the
Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1976), the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, § 301-28, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb (1976), the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 1-35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976), the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 1-32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976), the Investment Company
Act of 1940, §§ 1-53, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976,-, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 201-21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-2 (1976). See 17 C.F.R. §
200.2 (1980). Certain violations of the Securities Acts require a showing of willful
conduct, while others do not. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§
15(b)(4)(d),(e), 19(h)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(d),(e), 78s(h)(2) (1976) (willfulness required to prove violation) and Investment Company Act of 1940, § 9(b)(I)-(3), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-9(b)(1)-(3) (1976) (same) and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §
203(e)(4)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(4)-(5) (1976) (same) and 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1980)
(same) with Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(A)-(C), 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(4)(A)-(C) (1976) (willfulness not required to prove violation) and Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 9(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b)(1) (1976) (same) and Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(1)-(3) (1976) (same). The
term "willful" arising under the Securities Acts is analogous to the tort concept of
intent which is merely the desire to do the act. Knowledge that the act is a legal
wrong is not required. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 8 (4th ed.
1971) See, e.g., In re Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Underhill
Sec. Corp., 42 S.E.C. 689, 695-96 (1965). See generally Mathews, Litigation and
Settlement of SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 29 Cath. U.L. Rev. 215, 238-41 (1980).
Although this Note focuses on individuals and the deprivations they may suffer, corporations are also subject to disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Collins See. Corp. v.
SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Walston & Co., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 508
(1967); In re J.H. Goddard & Co., 42 S.E.C. 638 (1965).
2. See 45 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 117 (1979); Mathews, supra note 1, at 216-17. In
1979 the SEC brought 67 disciplinary proceedings, 511 injunctive actions, and referred 45 cases to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. See 45 S.E.C.
Ann. Rep., supra, at 121-22.
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the basic goal of the Securities Acts.' A significant percentage of the
participants in the securities industry are subject to this disciplinary
authority. The SEC has the authority to sanction individuals and corporations registered as brokers, dealers, or investment advisers, as
well as people associated or attempting to associate with these
parties. 4 In addition, the authority itself is broad. The SEC, for example, can
censure, place limitations on the activities, functions, or operations
of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke
the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds, on the record
after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such censure, placing
of limitations, suspension, or revocation is in the public interest.5

3. See General Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 583 F.2d 1108, 1109 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 183 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1970), Berko
v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1963); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976); id. § 19(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (1976); Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, § 203(3)(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1976); S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 12-13 (1934).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15(a)(4),(6), 15A, 190i0, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o(b)(4),(6), 78o-3, 78s(h) (1976). The terms broker and dealer have been broadly
defined. Generally, any individual or corporation trading in securities is deemed a
broker or dealer. Id. §§ 3(a)(4),(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4).(5) (1976). See generally S.
Jaffe, Broker-Dealers and Securities Markets § 2.01, at 13-15 (1977); N. Wolfson, R.
Phillips & T. Russo, Regulation of Brokers, Dealers and Securities Markets § 1.04, at
1-9 to 1-10 (1977). The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b3(e) (1976) authorizes administrative disciplinary proceedings against investment
advisers. The definition of investment adviser under the Act overlaps the definitions
of brokers and dealers and covers any person in the business of offering investment
advice for a fee. Id. § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1976). See generally H.
Bines, The Law of Investment Management §§ 2.05[2][a]-[c], at 2-30 to 2-35 (1978),
Lovitch, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Who is an "Incestment Adviser"?, 24
U. Kan. L. Rev. 67 (1975). The SEC may also sanction investment companies and
associated persons. Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 8-9, 42, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8
to 80a-9, 80a-41 (1976). The term "'[c]ompany'" in the statute is broadly construed to
include a "corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a
fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not, or any receiver, trustee in [bankruptcy] or similar official or any liquidating agent for any of the
foregoing, in his capacity as such." Id. § 2(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2ta)(8) (Supp. II
1978). The SEC is attempting to expand further the permissible scope of regulation.
See H. Bines, supra, § 3.04, at 3-67 to 3-72. The SEC can also criminally prosecute
or civilly enjoin violators of the Acts as an alternative to administrative hearings and
sanctions. 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976) (violations of the 1933 Act); id. § 77uuu (trustees),
id. § 78u (violations of the 1934 Act); id.§ 79r (public utilities corporations and their

subsidiaries); id. § 80a-41 (investment companies); id. § 80b-9 (investment advisers).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b4) (1976).
Other sanctions available to the SEC include revocation of a party's membership in
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Moreover, the SEC may deny attorneys, accountants, engineers, and
the privilege of
other professionals "temporarily or permanently,
' 6
appearing or practicing before it in any way. "
In light of the punitive nature of these disciplinary hearings, a
question has arisen concerning the burden of proof 7 that the SEC

one of the national stock exchanges or securities associations, id. § 19(h)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(h)(3) (1976), and barring a party from associating with other members of
a national securities exchange or securities association. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(3)
(1976). The SEC can also impose restitutionary remedies on parties through consent
decrees. See, e.g., In re Bateman, Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14579 (Mar. 20, 1978); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14149 (Nov. 9, 1977), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 81,365; In re Government Employees Ins. Co., SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 12930 (Oct. 27, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 9 95,750; In re Financial Programs, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 11312
(Mar. 24, 1975), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 80,146, See
generally Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29
Bus. Law. 121 (1974). The SEC also has the power to review disciplinary sanctions
imposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers, national stock exchanges,
and other regulatory or quasi-governmental agencies. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, §§ 15A, 15B, 17A, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78o-4, 78q-1, 78s (1976).
6. 17 C.F.R § 201.2(e) (1980) (Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice). The
validity and scope of Rule 2(e), especially as applied to attorneys, has been the subject of debate. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 578-82 (2d Cir. 1979);
In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15982 (July 2,
1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 82,124 (Karmel, dissenting). See generally Bialkin, Sanctions Against Accountants, 8 Rev. Sec. Reg. 823
(1975); Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants: Philosophy, Objectives and Approach, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 19 (1975); Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 Emory L.J. 747 (1975); Johnson,
The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC: Disciplinary
Hearings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rule of Practice, 25 Mercer L. Rev.
637 (1974); Mathews, supra note 1, at 225-226; Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of
Rule 2(e), 7 Sec. Reg. L.J. 54 (1979).
7. Burdens of proof " 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication. "' Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 422 (1979)
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The term
burden of proof has two independent meanings. In one sense it is used to denote the
degree to which a factfinder must be subjectively persuaded, based upon the evidence presented, that a particular fact exists. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958) (beyond a reasonable doubt); Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781,
784-85 (6th Cir. 1968) (clear and convincing), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969);
Carpenter v. Union Ins. Soc'y Ltd., 284 F.2d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1960) (same); Norton
v. Futrell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 586, 591-92, 308 P.2d 887, 891 (1957) (preponderance of
the evidence). For a general discussion of burden of proof as a degree of persuasion,
see F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure §§ 7.5 to .8 (2d ed. 1977); McCormick's
Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 336-341 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter
cited as McCormick]; 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2497-98 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp.
1980); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factftnding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065
(1968); Ligertwood, The Uncertainty of Proof, 10 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 367 (1976);
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must meet to prove violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Acts 8 that potentially result in the imposition of severe
sanctions. Traditionally, the SEC has applied a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof,9 rather than the more stringent clear and
convincing"0 or beyond a reasonable doubt" standards. The applicaMcBaine, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Cal. L. Rev. 242 (1944);
McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1382 (1955). The term burden of proof may also refer to the
duty of a particular party to come forward with evidence to prove a particular fact.
This duty is generally placed on the party seeking to change the status quo, usually
the plaintiff or prosecutor. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958);
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117-19 (1943); Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781,
785 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). For a discussion of the burden
of proof in the context of which party must come forward wvith evidence, see M.
Green, Basic Civil Procedure 110-13 (2d ed. 1979); McCormick, supra. § 338; 9 J.
Wigmore, supra, §§ 2487-89. Unless otherwise indicated, this Note uses the term
burden of proof as a degree of persuasion.
8. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). The
fraud provisions of the Securities Acts are commonly called the anti-fraud provisions.
See Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1959 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 199
(1963). For a general discussion of the concept of securities fraud, see 3 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1422-44 (2d ed. 1961).
9. See, e.g., In re M.V. Gray Investments, Inc., 44 S.E.C. 567, 575 (1971); In
re Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 458, 459-60 (1967); In re Underhill See. Corp., 42 S.E.C. 689,
695 (1965); In re White, 3 S.E.C. 466, 539-40 (1938). Proof by a preponderance or
weight of the evidence is the common standard for civil proceedings. 9 J. Wigmore,
supra note 7, § 2498. Under this standard the trier of fact "must believe that it is
more probable that the facts are true or exist than it is that they are false or do not
exist; but, it is not necessary to believe that there is a high probability that they are
true or exist, or necessary to believe to a point of almost certainty, or beyond a
reasonable doubt, that they are true or exist, or necessary to believe that they certainly are true or exist." McBaine, supra note 7, at 261; see McCormick, supra note
7, § 339, at 794-95. Other administrative agencies have also used a preponderance
standard. E.g., Walters v. McLucas, 597 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir.) (FAA revocation
of pilots license), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979); Alsbury v. United States Postal
Serv., 530 F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir.) (discharge of postal employee), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); Kephart v. Richardson, 505 F.2d 1085, 1089 (3d Cir. 1974) (termination of disability payments by HEW); Polcover v. Secretary of the Treasury, 477
F.2d 1223, 1231 (D.C. Cir.) (IRS discharge of employee), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1001 (1973). But see Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 47 Ad. L.2d 831, 835-37
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (clear and convincing standard for FCC revocation of broadcasting
license).
10. The intermediate burden of proof standard, that of clear and convincing evidence, reduces the probability that an innocent party will be held liable. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring). This standard requires a belief by the factfinder "that it is
highly probable that the facts are true or exist; while it is not necessary to believe to
the point of almost certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt that they are true or
exist, or that they certainly are true or exist; yet it is not sufficient to believe that it
is merely more probable that they are true or exist than it is that they are false or do
not exist." MeBaine, supra note 7, at 262-63; see Dacey v.Connecticut Bar Ass'n,
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bility of the preponderance standard, which equally allocates the risk
of error between the litigants," was recently upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Steadman v. SEC. 3 Although the appellant argued that a
higher burden of proof should be applied, the court held that the
preponderance standard adequately protected the interests of those
individuals facing the potential imposition of sanctions. 4
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, has expressly rejected
the preponderance burden of proof because of the nature of the sanctions available to the SEC. Focusing on the effect of the more severe
sanctions upon the individual's liberty interest, this Circuit has concluded that a higher standard, that of clear and convincing evidence,
is applicable in SEC disciplinary hearings.'" Under this intermediate

170 Conn. 520, 536-37, 368 A.2d 125, 135 (1976); J. Maguire, Evidence 180-81
(1947); McCormick, supra note 7, § 340(b), at 796-98; J. Weinstein, Basic Problems
of State and Federal Evidence 17 (5th ed. 1976). This intermediate standard is also
applied to proceedings in which a party attempts to prove fraud, undue influence,
the contents of a lost will or deed, a parol gift, a mutual mistake sufficient to allow a
court to reform a contract, and to impeach a notary's certificate. 9 J. Wigmore, supra
note 7, § 2498. The phrases clear and convincing; clear, unequivocal and convincing;
convincing proof; and clear and substantial have all been used to indicate an intermediate standard. See id.
11. The beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof is generally used in criminal
proceedings. McCormick, supra note 7, § 341; 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2497.
When the criminal standard is used, "[sjociety imposes almost the entire risk of error
upon itself." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); see Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 705-06 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Underwood, The Thumb on

the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299,
1302-04 (1977). This high standard of persuasion, however, is not required in every
aspect of a criminal proceeding. E.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1972)
(voluntariness of a criminal confession for the purposes of admission into evidence
need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence). The criminal standard has
also been applied to at least one civil proceeding that results in the imposition of
extreme sanctions. See United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931,
935-37 (7th Cir. 1975) (involuntary civil commitment for sexual dangerousness), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976).
12. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). "At one end of the spectrum is
the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since
society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiff's
burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share
the risk of error in roughly equal fashion." Id.
13. 602 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, tOO S. Ct. 1849 (1980) (No.
79-1266).
14. Id. at 1139. The defendant in the SEC disciplinary hearing petitioned for
certiorari, and it was granted. Steadman v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980) (No. 791266).
15. Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins Sec. Corp.
v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Compare 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 147 (1978)
(approving of the application of the clear and convincing standard to SEC disciplinary
proceedings) with 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1845 (1980) (criticizing the application of the
clear and convincing standard) and 12 Ga. L. Rev. 153 (1978) (same).
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standard of clear and convincing evidence, the factfinder must believe
that it is highly probable that the contested factual assertion is true.'
Although the District of Columbia Circuit cases have been decided
as a matter of policy,' 7 the imposition of a higher standard would be
mandatory if it is determined that the present procedural protection
is inadequate to satisfy the mandates of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 8 Procedural due process is the ultimate safeguard
against administrative unfairness." When administrative agencies
seek to impose sanctions that infringe upon an individual's liberty or
property, certain procedural safeguards are constitutionally required.
These safeguards become more or less rigorous Odepending upon a
balancing of three competing interests:"' the effect of the governmental action upon the individual's constitutionally protected interests;"
the fairness of the existing proceeding and the probable effect that
any additional procedural safeguards will have in increasing the
accuracy of the proceeding and further decreasing the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the individual's rights;23 and the governmental interests implicated in the proceeding, including the administrative feasibility of implementing additional procedures.2 ' This Note
will apply the procedural due process balancing test to the imposition
16. See note 10 supra.
17. See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680-681 (D.C. Cir. 1979), Collins See.
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Setting the burden of proof has
traditionally been left to the discretion of the courts. Woodby v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966); see, e.g., First Va. Bankshares v.
Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1320 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978),
Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1043-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
920 (1973).
18. "[N]o person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. Const. amend. V. The due process clause of the fifth
amendment applies only to the federal government while the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment applies to the states. Although this Note focuses on federal enforcement of the Securities Acts, its analysis also may be applied to the local
enforcement of state securities laws, commonly referred to as "blue sky" laws.
19. See National Ass'n of Recycling Indus. v. ICC, 627 F.2d 1328, 1334 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d 761, 766 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980); cf. Cantvell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (a statute
authorizing the judicial restraint of constitutional rights is "as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action").
20. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands");
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (19611
('"'[d]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances") (quoting Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1961) (Frankfurter. J., concurring)).
21. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-44 (1976).
22. Id. at 335, 339-43.
23. Id. at 343-37.
24. Id. at 34849.
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of sanctions pursuant to SEC disciplinary hearings and conclude that
the SEC's use of a preponderance burden of proof is constitutionally
defective in light of the potential deprivations resulting from the imposition of severe sanctions by the SEC.
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS

A. The Interests Defined
The first prong of the balancing test requires an examination of the
individual property and liberty interests that are infringed upon by
the governmental action." Focusing on this factor in Addington v.
Texas, 26 the Supreme Court held that the possible deprivation of
physical liberty inherent in an involuntary commitment proceeding"2
mandated the use of a clear and convincing burden of proof. 1
Although an individual is not deprived of his physical liberty as a
result of a SEC disciplinary proceeding, the imposition of sanctions
can deprive him of other significant liberty interests.9
The severe SEC sanctions of license revocation, disbarment from
appearing before the SEC, and permanent bar from associating with
other securities professionals, 30 prevent the individual from engaging
in his chosen profession. 3' Without a license, an individual can no
longer act as a broker, dealer, or investment adviser."2 If an attorney, accountant, or engineer is precluded from appearing before the
SEC, he cannot represent clients engaged in the securities industry'
and thus is excluded from further securities practice. Similarly, a pro25. Id. at 335.
26. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).

27. Id. at 433.
28. Id. at 421.
29. Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680 n.14, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins Sec.
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Arthur Lipper Corp. v.
SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976) (disciplinary actions visit serious consequences on the party), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); SEC v. National Student
Mkt'g Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 701 n.43 (D.D.C. 1978) (an injunction is a less
severe deprivation than disciplinary sanctions). See generally note 36 infra.
30. See notes 5, 6, supra and accompanying text.
31. Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins See. Corp. v.
SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). The Securities Acts require, with
few exceptions, that all securities professionals be registered or licensed. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1976) (requiring the registration of
any individual or company selling securities and providing exceptions for exclusively
interstate sales and exempt securities sales); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 8,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1976) (voluntary registration); Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
§ 203(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)-(b) (1976) (requiring the registration of investment
advisers with exception made for advice given for intrastate operations to insurance
companies and to small numbers of clients on a private basis).
33. See note 6 supra.
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larly, a prohibition against associating with other securities professionals precludes the individual from further employment in the field.
The purposes of these sanctions predetermine their results. By preventing an individual from engaging in any aspect of the securities
industry, these sanctions deprive him of his right to pursue a
livelihood,-3 a constitutionally protected interest that cannot be impaired absent procedural due process safeguards.Y
Courts have frequently applied a higher burden of proof in analogous proceedings that potentially result in the deprivation of a significant interest.
In the situation of attorney disbarment, for example,
a majority of the courts have recognized that the effect of disbarment
on the attorney's right to pursue a livelihood requires greater procedural protection than that which a mere preponderance standard
provides.Y In deportation proceedings, the Supreme Court has ap34. See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins See. Corp.
v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 148-55 (1974); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373
U.S. 96, 103 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39
(1957); R. Rabin, Perspectives on the Administrative Process 49-65 (1979). cf. Barry
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63-66 (1979) (lack of a prompt post-suspension hearing after
the revocation of horse trainer's license violates procedural due process). Dixon v.
Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977) ("due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to
the deprivation of some type of property interest") (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (notice and
hearing required in an administrative proceeding to suspend high school students to
protect their property interest in education); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 54243
(1971) (lack of a pre-suspension hearing before revocation of driver's license violates
procedural due process). See generally B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 8.11 (2d
ed. 1979); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 3-19, 15-14 (1978), Monaghan,
Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1977); Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 734-35 (1964). The label given to the interest infringed by
disciplinary proceedings is not determinative because both liberty and property are
protected by the Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V; see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (the "analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process
analysis as to property"); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 535, 552 (1972)
("Property does not have rights. People have rights ... a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in prop-

erty.").
36. E.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (criminal proceeding),
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979) (involuntary civil commitment),
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (criminal proceeding); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (defamation actions); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 365-68 (1970) (juvenile delinquency); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350,
353 (1960) (denaturalization); Nowack v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 663 (1958)
(denaturalization); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 135 (1958) (expatriation), Conzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 920 (1955) (per curiam) (expatriation).
37. See In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361, 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825
(1950); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 361 (E.D.Va.), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d
713 (9th Cir. 1967); People ex rel. Cline v. Kerker, 315 Ill. 572, 574, 146 N.E. 439,
439 (1925); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bailey. 2985 Md. 631, 644. 403 A.2d 1261,
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plied a clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard' because of the
loss of liberty engendered by the forced relocation of the individual
and the resultant loss of contemporary ties.39
When an individual is permanently barred from associating with
other securities professionals, the deprivation can be at least as severe as those imposed by deportation because the exclusion of the
sanctioned party from his profession vitiates his relationship with his
contemporary business ties.4" When compared to attorney disbarment, the deprivation may even be more severe because an SEC
sanction is effective nationwide,"' whereas a state may only prevent
an attorney from practicing within its jurisdiction." Thus, an indi1268 (1979); cf. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (disciplinary proceedings "are
adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature," and disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer); Ex parte Wall,
107 U.S. (17 Otto) 265, 288 (1882) (disbarment of attorneys is permissible only in the
clearest cases of misconduct to protect the integrity of the court); McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d Spec. Trtb. Supp. 1, 6, 138 Cal. Rptr.
459, 464, 546 P.2d 1, 6 (1977) (clear and convincing evidence needed to remove a
judge from the bench), State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So.
2d 487, 491 (Fla. 1973) (revocation of a professional license affects the individual's
livelihood and reputation subjecting such proceedings to a higher scrutiny); Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n v. Ryan, 248 So. 2d 790, 793 (Miss. 1971) (fraudulent
dealing must be clearly established to revoke a license); Margoles v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 47 Wis. 2d 499, 509, 177 N.W.2d 353, 358 (1970) (to revoke a
medical license "procedural due process often requires confrontation and crossexamination of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood"). See generally
ABA Center for Professional Discipline, Disciplinary Law and Procedure Research
System (1981); ABA Joint Committee on Professional Discipline, Professional Discipline for Lawyers and Judges 78-81, 130 (1979); Note, Disbarment in the United
States: Who Shall do the Noisome Work?, 12 Colum J.L. & Soc. Prob. 1 (1975).
Other administrative agencies have also disbarred attorneys from practicing before
them. E.g., Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926)
(Internal Revenue Service); Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 561 F.2d 228
(7th Cir. 1977) (Immigration and Naturalization Service); Herman v. Dulles, 205
F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (International Claims Commission).
38. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285-86
(1966).
39. "The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by
denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in the expulsion from
our shores. And many resident aliens have lived in this country longer and established stronger family, social, and economic ties here than some who have become
naturalized citizens." Id. at 286.
40. See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Steadman v. SEC,
603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980); L. Jaffe,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action 267-68 (1965); Lacy, Adverse Publicity and
SEC Enforcement Procedure, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 435, 435 (1977).
41. See S. Jaffe, supra note 4, § 1.04; Thomforde, Controlling Administrative
Sanctions, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 709, 711 (1976).
42. Although the disbarment of an attorney in one state can lead to disbarment in
another state in which the individual is also licensed to practice, nationwide disbarment is not certain. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957)
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vidual subject to SEC sanctions should be afforded the same procedural protection as attorneys facing disbarment, and aliens facing deportation.
" '[L]iberty' is [also] implicated and procedural due process is required when government action threatens an [individual's] good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity." 3 Such a situation arises
when an individual is sanctioned by the SEC on findings of fraudulent conduct." Courts have long recognized that allegations of fraud
connote corruption and moral turpitude 4 and " 'might seriously damage [one's] standing and associations in [the] community.' "' Consequently, the courts have imposed an intermediate burden of proof in
civil fraud cases 4 7 in recognition of the "adverse social consequences
("[Dlisbarment by federal courts does not automatically flow from disbarment by state
courts."); Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193, 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (as a
matter of interstate comity or pursuant to the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution, disbarment of an individual by a sister state may be held to be conclusive, but the forum state may choose not to follow the other state's judgment if it is
deemed "so deficient or lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard, that there was
such a paucity of proof, or that there was some other grave reason which would make
it unjust to accept the foreign judgment"), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968), In re
Kimball, 40 A.D.2d 252, 254, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, 305 (1973) (the court did not give
full faith and credit to the disbarment of an individual by another state because
"[r]easons of policy regarded as significant in one State ... may not prevail in
another State"). In the instances of both attorney disbarment and SEC sanctioning,
the individual is not disbarred forever. The SEC, acting pursuant to 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15ab-1 (1980), may reinstate parties who have been excluded from the industry
by its sanctions. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11267 (Feb. 26, 1975), [19741975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 80,115; Investment Company Act
Release No. 8689 (Feb. 26, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,115; Investment Advisers Act Release No. 438 (Feb. 26, 1975), [19741975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 80,115; see Tager v. SEC, 344
F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1965). The state and federal bars also permit reinstatement. See,
e.g., Levenson v. Mills, 294 F.2d 397, 399 (1st Cir. 1961). cert. denied, 368 U.S.
954 (1962); In re Spriggs, 90 Ariz. 387, 388, 368 P.2d 456, 457 (1962); In re Hiss,
368 Mass. 447, 453, 333 N.E.2d 429, 434 (1975).
43. McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 1973).
44. See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Collins See. Corp.
v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
45. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 2.27-28 (1951). United States Steel Corp.
v. Darby, 516 F.2d 961, 963 (5th Cir. 1975); Lozano-Giron v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 506 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1974), McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d
314, 319-20 (4th Cir. 1973).
46. McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
47. Lalone v. United States, 164 U.S. 255, 261 (1896), Maxwell Land-Grant
Case, 121 U.S. 325, 380-82 (1887); Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425
F.2d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970), Goodman v. Poland,
395 F. Supp. 660, 686 n. 17 (D. Md. 1975); Pinney & Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176
F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Yoo Hoo Bottling Co. v. Leibowitz, 432 Pa. 117,
119, 247 A.2d 469, 470 (1968) (per curiam); Beckett v. Department of Social Health
Servs., 87 Wash. 2d 184, 186-87, 550 P.2d 529, 531 (1976). The standard of clear and
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to the individual" 41 engendered by such proceedings.
Although securities fraud is a broader concept than common law
fraud,49 the stigma occasioned by an administrative finding of securities fraud is equivalent to that occasioned by common law fraud. The
finding of fraud, whether in a civil forum or a SEC disciplinary hearing, still connotes dishonesty and disgrace. 5' Even the mere characterization of the violation as fraud is sufficient to allow the investing
public to draw a stigmatizing inference."'
Moreover, the certainty of being stigmatized is greater when dealing with securities fraud than with common law fraud. Information is
disseminated rapidly in the securities industry."2 This is heightened

convincing evidence has also been applied in federal tax fraud proceedings. See, e.g.,
Mensik v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 827
(1964); Lessman v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 1964); Kurnick v.
Commissioner, 232 F.2d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 1956).
48. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). Some courts have imposed the
clear and convincing standard to ensure a presumption of honesty and fair dealing on
the part of all individuals. See, e.g., United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100
(1951); United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 225 U.S. 219, 226 (1912); Plantation Key Developers v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164, 172 (5th Cir. 1979).
49. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980); 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at
1421-46. The concept of fraud under the Securities Acts is flexible to meet the challenge of protecting the investing public from "a certain class of gentleman [who] ...
would lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy way of
evading the law." State v. Whiteaker, 118 Or. 656, 661, 247 P. 1077, 1079 (1926).
50. See Ross v. A. H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979); Whitney v.
SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714,
725 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 68 F.R.D. 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
51. See Arenson, Ruin of 2 Wall Street Careers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1981, at
29, col. 3. The word "fraud" itself connotes moral turpitude. See SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193-94 (1963); United States v. Snider,
502 F.2d 645, 650-52 (4th Cir. 1974); Sherwood & Roberts-Kennewick, Inc. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 70, 73-75 & n., (9th Cir. 1963). See generally Webster's New International Dictionary 1003 (2d ed. 1957) (defining fraud as the
"quality of being deceitful").
52. "Much of securities law is intended to reduce speculation in stock. Yet in
stock trading as elsewhere, speculation serves the salutary purpose of enabling rapid
adjustments of prices to current values. The speculator is the eager searcher for
undervalued and overvalued securities. The information that he uncovers diffuses
rapidly throughout the market . . . enabling other traders to adjust as rapidly as
possible to the changed conditions discovered by the speculator." R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 333-34 (2d ed. 1977). "The adverse publicity resulting from
the institution of public enforcement proceedings may have as severe an impact on
the respondent or defendant as any formal sanction ultimately imposed." Lacy, supra
note 40, at 441. "The daily operations of the securities industry depend on reputation
and trust. Persons subject to SEC regulation must strive for its favor, because they
are confronted with regulations administered by it at every turn, and because the
agency has broad discretion in administering those legal requirements. Hence, those
subject to SEC regulation will avoid association with targets of the agency's suspicions." Id. at 435 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, newspapers publicize the allegations
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by the SEC's statutory authority to conduct public disciplinary
hearings 3 and to circulate investigatory reports prior to taking disciplinary action.- Thus, as soon as an individual is adjudged to have
violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts, it is likely
that this result will become known to investors with whom the individual transacts business.
The stigma caused by governmental action, however, does not in
itself justify the imposition of further procedural safeguards." Stigma
when combined with the deprivation of another significant liberty interest is sufficient to compel additional due process protection.'
In
the case of SEC disciplinary hearings, the concomitant deprivation of
livelihood engendered by the imposition of sanctions constitutes a
deprivation of liberty sufficient to compel raising the burden of proof.
made by the SEC in its disciplinary action. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977,
§ D, at 1, col. 1. See also Lacy, supra note 40, at 441-42.
53. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.400-402 (1980); see Gellhorn. Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1380, 1397 & n.64 (1973) (listing the criteria
applied by the SEC to determine whether to publicize its disciplinary proceedings
by holding a public instead of a private hearing).
54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) t1976). The SEC
can also publish reports of investigations that do not lead to criminal, civil or disciplinary action as an enforcement tool. Mathews, supra note 1, at 226-29. The SEC
may also issue press releases to announce the institution of disciplinary proceedings.
17 C.F.R. § 201.6(c) (1980). This added publicity may increase the extent to which
the individual is deprived of his liberty. As the Supreme Court noted, "the degree
of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be
considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of the
potential injuries to reputation and business engendered by the adverse publicity of
SEC proceedings, see Securities Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices Report 28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement
Report], reprinted in A. Mathews, B. Finkelstein, & H. Milstein, Enforcement and
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws 313 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement and Litigation]; Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1394-98; Lacy, supra note 40,
at 441-458.
55. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). The Court has taken a far more
restrictive view of the constitutional questions involved when a stigma is imposed
upon a party. Damage to an individual's "reputation alone . . . is [nleither 'liberty'
[n]or 'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due

Process Clause." Id. at 701. See generally Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section
1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 191 (1977). The most recent
case from the District of Columbia Circuit, Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628
F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 317 (1980), implies that the factors of
stigma and deprivation of livelihood, although somewhat interrelated, can be independent grounds for imposing an intermediate burden of proof. Id. at 175 n.41.
56. "[R]eputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment," does not justify the imposition of further procedural safeguards. Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see Marrero v. City of Hialea, 625 F.2d 499,
515-16 (5th Cir. 1980) (defamatory statement causing damage to the plaintiff's business goodwill and business reputation satisfied the "stigma plus' rule of Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 2,
1981) (No. 80-786).
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B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second prong of the balancing test requires an analysis of
whether the existing procedure adequately protects against erroneous
deprivations of life, liberty, or property. 7 The probable effect of any
additional procedural protections in preventing such erroneous deprivations must also be examined. The risk of erroneous deprivation
under the present system is substantial because the preponderance
burden of proof, perhaps the lowest possible standard, allows the
highest risk of error.5 1 In Steadman v. SEC, 9 however, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that an individual's interests are adequately protected by a preponderance standard because the decision in the disciplinary hearing is subject to judicial review."0 This reasoning is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, burdens of proof govern findings of
fact.6' When a court reviews the actions of an administrative agency,
however, it normally scrutinizes only the conclusions that have been
drawn from the factual findings.62 Thus, appellate review cannot protect against erroneous findings of fact. Second, the very purpose of
imposing additional procedural safeguards is to grant uniform protection, rather than ad hoc review. 3 If the Fifth Circuit's rationale were
carried to its logical conclusion, applying procedural due process safeguards to any proceeding that is subject to judicial review would be
precluded.
Clearly, raising the burden of proof will decrease the risk of
erroneous deprivation because the theory underlying burdens of
proof indicates that as the standard rises, the risk of an innocent party
being found guilty decreases.'
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
stated that
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345-47 (1976).
58. See notes 7, 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
59. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980) (No.
79-1266).
60. Id. at 1139.
61. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 427 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n, 441 U.S. 182, 189 (1973); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327
U.S. 608, 612 (1946); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 299 (1938);
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276 F. Supp. 610, 612 (S.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd per
cur/jam, 406 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
63. See La Blatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Morse, 491 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1974); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 615 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); cf. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153-54 (1979) (collateral estoppel "fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing
the possibility of inconsistent decisions"); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697
n.23 (1975) (raising the burden of proof sets a uniform limitation on sentencing
bodies).
64. See notes 7, 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
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even if the particular standard-of-proof catchwords do not always
make a great difference in a particular case, adopting a 'standard of
proof is more than an empty semantic exercise.' In cases involving
individual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof
... reflects the value society places on individual liberty. ' -

Utilizing the clear and convincing standard will make the factfinder
and the SEC enforcement division more aware of the significant
liberty interests at stake in the disciplinary hearing.' Consequently,
the risk of erroneous deprivation will decrease, and an individual's
right to pursue a livelihood and to protect his interest in his reputation will be safeguarded.
II.

THE GOVERNMENrAL INTEREST

The third prong of the balancing test requires analysis of the governmental interest in the continued use of the present procedure,
and the resultant burden accompanying the imposition of additional
safeguards.
This analysis involves an examination of the effect of

additional procedures on the ability of the particular governmental
agency to pursue its statutory goals.6 It also focuses upon the added
governmental expense that would be incurred as a result of the imposition of greater procedural safeguards.-6

Initially, it should be noted that the weight accorded the governmental interest in a procedure is affected by whether the procedure has been established as a matter of administrative policy or has
been specifically mandated by legislative action. The presence of ex-

65. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland,
436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in
part), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
66. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1979); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970). In determining the burden of proof the Court has focused upon
the effects of the various standards in enhancing the relative fairness of the proceeding. See note 57 supra. The initial decision of the prosecuting party to bring an
action is also affected because of the symbolic and practical effects of higher burdens
of proof. Prosecutors faced with higher burdens of proof may refrain from bringing
suits that they might have brought under a lower burden. See Brief for Appellee at
23, Steadman v. SEC, No. 79-1266 (U.S., filed Feb. 15, 1980). Additionally, the
SEC has contended that although lay juries may not be sufficiently aware of the
potential effects of SEC sanctions and may need to have this prospect imposed upon
them through a higher burden of proof, this is not true of administrative factfinders
who are trained experts. Brief for Appellee at 22 n.21, Steadman v. SEC, No. 791266 (U.S., filed Feb. 15, 1980). Administrative experts, however, also need instruction concerning the basic guidelines as to the acceptable degree of persuasion. See
McBaine, supra note 7, at 244.
67. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347, 349 (1976).
68. Id. at 347-48.
69. Id. at 347.
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plicit legislative action indicates a more compelling governmental
interest." A firm congressional decision merits such deference because, as a practical matter, Congress is better able to weigh the
competing interests by holding hearings, debates, and commissioning
research projects. 7'
The SEC contends that section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) 72 establishes a burden of proof for its administrative proceedings.7 3 Section 7(c) provides that "[a] sanction may not
be imposed ... except on consideration of the whole record ... and
supported by and in accordance with . . . reliable, probative, and
Relying on the phrase "reliable, probative,
substantial evidence." '
and substantial evidence," in conjunction with the reference to the
term "burden of proof" in both the text and title of section 7(c), 75 the SEC
70. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). The weight given to the governmental interest logically
turns on the degree to which the legislature has discussed the issue and the detail
employed in the drafting of the statute.
71. M. Jewell & S. Patterson, The Legislative Process In The United States 41641 (3d ed. 1977); M. McGeary, The Development of Congressional Investigative
Power 7-48 (1940).
72. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305,
3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976), was enacted in response to a fear that administrative
agencies were becoming an uncontrollable fourth branch of the government. See
Hearings on Federal Administrative Procedure Before the House Comm. of the
Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1945) (statement of David A. Simmons)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings], reprinted in Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 48-49 (1946) [hereinafter
cited as APA Legislative History]. The APA establishes minimum procedural requirements for agencies to follow. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 3, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1946) [hereinafter
cited as House Report], reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra, at 250. This
statute mandated greater public disclosure of agency operations and codified judicial
review of agency actions and notice and hearing requirements for agency rulemaking
and adjudications. See S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 8-10 (1945)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra, at
189, 193-95; K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 1.04, at 8-9 (3d ed. 1972). For a
general history of the development of the APA, see U. Lavery, Federal Administrative Law §§ 1-13 (1952). See generally G. Warren, The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies (1947).
73. See In re M.V. Gray Invs., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 567, 575 (1971); In re Pollisky, '13
S.E.C. 458, 459-60 (1967). There are numerous examples of APA requirements being
applied to SEC disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 5,17
F.2d 171, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1976) (judicial review), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978);
Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d 358, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (notice and hearings). See also
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(a) (1976) (expressly applying certain APA provisions to SEC operations).
74. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. 556(d) (1976).
75. Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 556
(1976), is entitled "Hearings: presiding employees; powers and duties; burden of
proof; evidence; record as a basis of decision." The text of this section states in part
that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has
the burden of proof." id., 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
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has concluded that a preponderance of the evidence standard has
been mandated by Congress.76 This assertion, however, is unfounded. The weight of the legislative history, as well as the majority
of the cases dealing with this issue, indicates that Congress intended
to impress upon the administrative agencies the expanded role of
judicial review under the APA n and to formulate a standard measuring the quality of the evidence,"' not a burden of proof. Moreover,
76. E.g., In re M.V. Gray Invs., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 567, 567-75 (1971). In re Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 458, 459-60 (1967). In Pollisky, the SEC. relying on Justice Clark's
dissent in Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966),
concluded that the term ""reliable, probative, and substantial evidence' " contained
in the text of the statute signalled an intent to impose a preponderance burden of
proof. 43 S.E.C. at 459-60. In Woodby, Justice Clark had argued that this phrase,
contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 106ta)(4), 242(b1L4), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1105a(a)(4), 1252(b)(4) (1976), set a preponderance standard. 385 U.S. at
288 n. 1 (Clark, J., dissenting).
77. Compare In re M.V. Gray Invs., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 567, 575 (1971 (the APA
established a preponderance standard) and In re Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 458, 459-60
(1967) (same) with Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 3S5 U.S. 276,
283 (1966) ("reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" denotes a quality of
evidence standard) and Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director,
583 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (4th Cir. 1978) (less than a preponderance standard established), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979) and Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276 F.
Supp. 610, 612-13 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (APA sets less than a preponderance standard),
aff'd per curiam, 406 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
78. Congress was cognizant that the word "substantial" did not constitute a burden of proof standard because it explicitly referred to Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938), which squarely held that references to -substantial" established a scope of review standard. See House Report, supra note 72, at 37,
reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 72, at 271. 92 Cong. Bee. 5653
(1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 72. at 365 tstatement of
Rep. Walter). The original draft of the APA did not contain the word "substantial."
The draft was subsequently amended to increase the similarity between § 7(c) and
§ 10 and to increase administrative awareness of judicial review. House Report,
supra note 72, at 53 nn.16-18, reprinted in APA Legislative History. supra note 72.
at 287 nn. 16-18.
79. "The second and primary sentence [which in the Senate draft contained the
phrase 'relevant, reliable, and probative evidence'] of the subsection is framed on the
theory that an administrative hearing is to be compared with an equity proceeding in
the courts. The mere admission of evidence is not to be taken as prejudicial error
(there being no lay jury to be protected from improper influence) although irrelevant
and unduly repetitious evidence is to be excluded as a matter of efficiency and good
practice; and no finding or conclusion may be entered except upon evidence which is
plainly of the requisite materiality and competence; that is, 'relevant, reliable, and
probative evidence.' Thus while the exclusionary 'rules of evidence' do not apply
except as the agency may as a matter of good practice simplify the hearing and
record by excluding obviously improper or unnecessary evidence, the standards and
principles of probity and reliability of evidence must be the same as those prevailing
in courts of law or equity in nonadministrative cases." Senate Report, supra note 72,
at 23, reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 72, at 208; see id. at 39, 43,
reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 72, at 228 (AppendL to the Attorney General's Statement regarding the APA); Attorney General's Manual on the
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such an assertion is undercut by the SEC's recent opposition to two
regulatory reform bills before Congress because they did not contain
provisions that set a preponderance burden of proof for disciplinary
proceedings."0 Consequently, it is tenuous to assert that the preponderance of the evidence standard in SEC disciplinary hearings reflects more than an administrative policy determination.
Regardless of the origins of the use of the preponderance standard
in SEC disciplinary hearings, however, the burden accompanying the
imposition of the additional safeguard must also be examined." The
SEC has argued that its choice of a particular burden of proof represents an exercise of its rulemaking power,12 and that any judicial determination of such a standard would impermissibly infringe upon
that power.8 The SEC has based this argument on the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Reources Defense Council, Inc.,1 which held that only "constitutional
constraints or extremely compelling circumstances" justifies the imposition of additional procedural safeguards that affect an agency's
rulemaking power.5 The potential deprivations of liberty and property inherent in a SEC disciplinary hearing, however, form the basis
Administrative Procedure Act 75-80 (1973). The interpretation of the APA by the
attorney general, who is responsible for enforcing the Act, is particularly relevant
because "a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the officer charged with its
enforcement is entitled to great weight." United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 96
(1956); cf. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 283
(1966) (interpreting the phrase "reasonable, substantial and probative" as setting a
quality standard of evidence).

80. Regulatory Reform Legislation: Hearings on S.262, S.755, S.445, S.93 Before
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. 1325 (1979) (memorandum of the SEC). Congress did not adopt the SEC's proposal.
81. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105, 112-15 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
82. Brief for Appellee at 46-49, Steadman v. SEC, No. 79-1266 (U.S., filed Feb.
15, 1980). Rulemaking involves the setting of policy goals by an agency, as opposed
to adjudicative actions, which involve an agency determination of facts. See K. Davis,
supra note 72, § 5.01. Burdens of proof are procedural in nature and fall within the
scope of rulemaking as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 4(a),
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976). But see United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410
U.S. 224, 251-55 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (characterizing a ratemaking proceeding as adjudicative). See generally Ginnaane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and
Exceptions Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621 (1947);
Netterville, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Interpretation, 20 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
83. Brief for Appellee at 46-49, Steadman v. SEC, No. 79-1266 (U.S., filed Feb.
15, 1980).
84. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For a discussion of the effects of Vermont Yankee, see 1
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 6:35-37 (2d ed. 1978); Byse, Vermont
Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View,
91 Harv. L. Rev. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1805 (1978).
85. 435 U.S. at 543 (1978); see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,
606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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for "constitutional constraints or compelling circumstances" that
would allow a court to raise the burden of proof." Moreover, the
Court has noted that the imposition of a higher burden of proof does
not invade the "traditional discretion [of a sanctioning] bod[y]"I because the facts have been determined under a constitutionally
accepted burden of proof and the agency will be free to decide which
sanction to adopt.!
The SEC has also contended that a higher burden of proof will
prevent the agency from enforcing the Securities Acts effectively."
It has argued that it "would not be likely to expend its limited resources in initiating meritorious cases in which it was possible clear
and convincing evidence would not be available. And, in those cases
that were brought, the Commission would be forced to withhold
sanctions needed to protect investors." '
Such a result, however, is
unlikely. The SEC presently conducts a full investigation before it
decides to bring any kind of enforcement action."! Thus, the decision
to pursue severe sanctions through a disciplinary proceeding is made
after the agency has commited its resources. Moreover, the added
procedural protection of a clear and convincing burden of proof will
not result in a greater financial burden on the SEC. Changing the
burden of proof, unlike the addition of other procedures such as
notice and a hearing, does not alter the physical or financial requirements of the proceeding."' Rather, it affects the mental processes of
the factfinder by establishing a subjective level of persuasion that
must be reached before finding that a violation has occurred.'
86. See Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulator' Comm'n,
627 F.2d 499, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,
617 F.2d 611, 619 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1979); National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall,
601 F.2d 689, 699 n.35 (3d Cir. 1979); note 35 supra and accompanying text.
87. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697 n.23 (1975).
88. Id.
89. Brief for Appellee at 23, Steadman v. SEC, No. 79-1266 (U.S., filed Feb. 15,
1980).
90. Id.
91. Enforcement Report, supra note 54, at 28. reprinted in Enforcement and
Litigation, supra note 54, at 312; see S. Jaffe, supra note 4, § 4.02; 3 L. Loss, supra
note 8, at 1946. See generally E. Brodsky, Guide to Securities Litigation 3-27 (1974).
92. The costs in time and money are minimal because additional personnel are
not required to implement a higher standard and the additional time spent by the
factfinder to evaluate the evidence is difficult to measure. Other procedural due process protections such as notice, hearing, limited right to assistance of counsel, and
opportunity to cross examine adverse witnesses have already been made mandator'
in SEC disciplinary proceedings without hindering the SEC's performance of its
functions. E.g., Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d 358, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (written notice
required in license revocation proceedings); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(4) (1976) (notice and hearing); Investment Company Act
of 1940, § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1976) (same); 17 C.F.R. § 201.21 (1980) (oral
argument); see S. Jaffe, supra note 4, § 4.02.
93. See notes 7, 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
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The clear and convincing standard is a feasible burden of proof to
apply in disciplinary proceedings. It has been applied in the District
of Columbia Circuit for approximately three years.94 During this
time, the SEC has frequently met this higher standard in proving
violations of the Securities Acts. 5 This intermediate standard also
has been used successfully in common law fraud cases for over one
hundred years." Theoretically, the imposition of a higher burden of
proof may make it more difficult for the SEC to impose severe sanctions. Nevertheless, such a possibility does not militate against mandating a standard that will more accurately reflect the individual interests at stake in a disciplinary hearing.
CONCLUSION

"In situations when individuals stand to suffer serious liabilities as a
consequence of administrative action, justice may be served by demanding increased procedural protections." '
Burdens of proof provide such protection by "reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error."" The preponderance standard presently used in SEC
disciplinary hearings does not adequately protect the individual liberties at stake. As a policy consideration, courts have focused on the
hardship potentially imposed on the individual and have raised the
burden of proof. Considering the other factors involved in a formal
due process analysis, the balance still favors the need to protect the
liberty interests of the individual.*
Gordon K. Eng
94. E.g., Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins See.
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
95. See, e.g., In re Capital Planning Sec. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 13815 (Aug. 1, 1977); In re Blumenfeld, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
16437 (Dec. 19, 1979), [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,396;
In re Mansfield, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16330 (Nov. 8, 1979); In re
D.M.R. Securities, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16322 (Nov. 6, 1979);
In re Hodgin, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16225 (Sept. 27, 1979), [1979-80
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,334.
96. See Townshend v. Strangroom, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1078-79 (1801); Henkle v.
Royal Exch. Assurance Co., 27 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1056 (1749).
97. Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 914, 919 (1966).
98. Ivan v. New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204 (1972) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)).
* After this Note was printed, the Supreme Court upheld the use of a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof in SEC disciplinary hearings. Steadman
v. SEC, 49 U.S.L.W. 4174 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1981) (No. 79-1266). The Court based its
decision on the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
(1976), concluding that Congress had affirmatively established a preponderance standard applicable to all administrative agencies. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4175-77. The Court,
however, expressly left open the question, addressed in this Note, whether the imposition of such a standard is constitutionally acceptable. Id. at 4176 n.15.

